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Metrix committed a violation of§ 2(c), the 
MBNA had not proven by a 
•t had standing to sue, l.e., h t 
l caused MBNA to suffer actual injury of a type t a 
was designed to prevent. 828 F.2d at 1046. See, 
Brunswgck, 1. the Clayton provides: II [A]ny 
5 who shall be injured in his buslness or property 
person f anything forbidden in the antitrust laws may sue 
o and shall recover threefold the damages by 
there or · · · 11 15 U.S.C. § 15(a). Even if a him sustained. · · · t•t t laws d f d t has committed a violation of the an l.rus 
e injury,), it does.not necessarllY follow 
a plaintiff has antitrust standlng. To r:coverf 
laintiff must make some showlng o ac ua 
to something 
desi ned to prevent. Brunswick v. ue o ow , • 
429 gus 477 (1977). The United States Supreme Court has · · 1 f tors it will consider on a 
enumerated acetermine whether a plaintiff has 
nature of the 
. · [i e does it fall squarely Wlthin the area o 
l tive ?] the directness or is it tenuous and specu a . , ti l f 
and the existence of more direct CVlCtlimls. 
t f Cal v Cal. St. ounc , · · Contrac ors o · · u •ted Airlines Inc. (1983) See also, Sharp v. nl , . • 
967 F 2d 404 (lOth Cir. 1992). (Employe:s .of Frontl:rf · .· t d" to sue United Alrllnes, even l 
of the antitrust laws causing 
Frontier to fail.) 
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BARGAINING WITH STAKEHOLDERS: 
CORPORATE CODES OF CONDUCT AND SHAREHOLDER WEALTH 
by 
Julianne Nelson* 
Corporate codes of conduct or ethics have become increasingly 
popular in recent years. Of the 264 companies responding to 
a recent Conference Board survey, more than 75% had some form 
of ethics code; almost half of the firms with codes in place 
had adopted them since 1987. 1 Nor is the adoption of codes 
merely a recent phenomenon: a 1980 study by White and 
Montgomery found that almost 100% of the largest US 
corporations had codes in place. 2 
When, if ever, would a self-interested shareholder support a 
corporate code of conduct? Do such codes ever increase 
shareholder wealth? If one relies on instincts honed by the 
study of competitive markets, one is likely to assume that 
benefits for customers, suppliers, employees and the local 
community necessarily come at the expense of corporate 
shareholders. The very structure of the much-publicized 
Johnson and Johnson (J&J) Credo (reprinted in the Appendix) 
appears to support this hypothesis. When detailing corporate 
responsibilities, the Credo mentions the interests of 
corporate shareholders last, only after it enumerates the 
duties owed to a variety of other stakeholders. In effect, 
the J&J Credo seems to implement a plural purpose view of the 
firm that asks managers to serve a number of constituencies. 
It remains to be seen whether or not this approach could also 
benefit a strictly self-interested shareholder. 
Recent results from applied bargaining theory suggest that the 
J&J Credo may actually increase shareholder wealth in some 
circumstances. Institutional theorists have recently turned 
to "cooperative" solution concepts to determine the efficiency 
implications of different corporate ownership structures. In 
general, research in this area starts from the assumption that 
* Assistant Professor, Economics Area, Stern School of 
Business, New York University, 44 West 4th Street, New York, 
NY 10003. I would like to thank Robert Lindsay for his most 
helpful comments on an earlier version of this work. 
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the output of a particular firm is the of effort 
and that at least some individual contr1but1ons to th1s output 
cannot be observed or measured accurately. 
contracting" on the basis of individual effort 1s 1mp?ss1ble 
in this context, it becomes necessary to. spec1fy an 
alternative rule for allocating corporate prof1ts among the 
relevant 
In general, the rules proposed depend on both the surJ?lus 
generated by the group as a whole and the al ternat1 ves 
available to subgroups (or "coalition:-"> should they C:hoose to 
opt out of the bargain. The ava1lable alternat1yes (or 
default options) are in turn defined by the property r1ghts of 
the coalition members. For example, Hart and Moore (1990) use 
the surplus sharing rule proposed by Lloyd Shapley.(1953) to 
study the impact of decentralized asset ownersh1p on the 
investment efforts of corporate claimants. In wo:k, 
Holmstrom and Tirole (1991) use the 
to characterize the impact of allow1ng subs1d1ar1es to 
"defect" by refusing to trade with their parent company. 
In this paper, I adapt the model developed by Hart and Moo:e 
(1990) to illustrate the incentive effects of the 
structure implied by the J&J credo. I assume the s?c1al value 
of a firm's activities depends on the effort (or 
undertaken bv both shareholders and (non-equ1ty-own1ng) 
stakeholders.J In other words, I assume that . 'both 
shareholders and stakeholders may take costly (and non-
contractible) actions to increase the value of output 
by the firm. The benefits and the costs of th1s non-
contractible effort depend on the share of corporate assets 
initially allocated to each player. 4 
This scenario arises whenever the firm's cost of 
depends on employee care, on employees' f1rm-spec1f1c 
expertise or on the range of amenities by the local 
community. It also arises when company prof1ts.depend on the 
firm • s reputation or on the care and precaut1ons .taken by 
consumers. Each of these can be as a 
duopoly in which each player's 1nvestment depends 
both on his or her anticipated share of the f1rm's surplus and 
on the action taken by the other player. 
Read literally the J&J Credo strengthens the bargaining 
position of stakeholders by enhancing their default 
options. If treated as a contract, the Credo would 
essentially give workers, suppliers, customers, the local 
community etc. grounds for suit if J&J fails to treat these 
fairly. To formalize this commitment by J&J, I 
characterize the Credo as a transfer of some corporate assets 
from shareholders to stakeholders. 
For the purposes of exposition, I limit discussion to workers 










that th: asset to be allocated between shareholders and 
workers .1s worker health. For example, J&J shareholders would 
have - 1n the absence of the Credo - an ownership claim of 
to both assets of the firm and the health 
of 1ts employees. W1thout the Credo, J&J would be limited 
only.by.imJ?erfect OSHA supervision and workers• compensation 
prem1a 1f chose to overlook workplace hazards. Since the 
Credo prom1ses workers better on-the-job conditions it 
reduces the precautions that workers must take on their to 
protect their physical (and emotional) health. 
In this paper, I show that such an asset transfer may increase 
both the total surplus generated by the firm and the wealth of 
. . As the asset transfer strengthens the 
barga1n1ng pos1t1on of workers vis a vis shareholders it 
strengthens the incentive (and lowers the cost) for 
to on behalf of the firm. Shareholders have 
the 1ncent1ve to transfer assets if the gains from increased 
worker effort more than offset the cost of the enhanced worker 
position combined with the cost of the transfer 1tself. 
1. Notation 
first task is to .define the surplus generated by the 
d1fferent player comb1nations for a given allocation of 
corporate assets. I assume that there are two "players"· I 
label the representative shareholder/manager (the "owner") 1 as 
player 1 and the representative worker/stakeholder as player 
2 · . assume that production requires a combination of 
assets (a11 .a2) and player effort (x11 x2). For cons1st7ncy of notat1on, let x 1 represent the level of 
manager1al effort chosen by player 1 and let x
2 
represent the 
level of worker effort chosen by player 2. 
The existing assets to be allocated are the firm's physical 
plant and worker health. I assume throughout that while 
shareholders own all of the firm's physical plant workers may 
only own a their health. More let a
1 represent the ex1st1ng physical plant and let a
2 
represent 
worker health. I assume that player 1 owns all of asset a 
while pl?Y7r 2 owns. only a fraction a, osas1, of asset 
rema1n1ng fract1on (1-a) of asset a 2 is owned by player 
To. illustrate the structure of the bargaining problem that 
and workers, I use the following general 
notat1on to the value of output (or joint surplus) 
produced by d1fferent player coalitions: 
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output of owner and worker together: V (XI 1 X2l al 1 a2) 
Output produced by owner alone: v(x1 la11 (1-a)a2) 
output produced by worker alone: v (x21 aa2) 
Output of the "empty" coalition: v(O) = 0 
From this notation it follows that the value of output for a 
particular coalition depends on both the assets owned (ai) by 
coalition members and the levels of effort (xi) that members 
undertake. 
I assume that the structure of asset ownership also affects 
the cost of effort for individual players. In particular, 
cost of owner effort: c 1 (x1 la1 , (1-a)a2 ) 
cost of worker effort: c 2 (x2laa2) · 
This notation indicates that an individual player's cost of 
effort depends on the assets he or she owns, but not on the 
level of effort undertaken by the other members of the 
coalition. These cost functions also reflect the assumption 
that the representative worker owns a share a of asset a 2 and 
has no ownership claim on asset a 1 • 7 
2. The Bargaining Problem 
Given the production and cost functions specified in Section 
1 it remains to define and solve the bargaining problem that 
between owners and workers for a given allocation of 
existing assets. To divide up the results of joint 
production, I rely on the "cooperative" approach proposed in 
Shapley (1953). This solution concept gives to each player a 
share of output equal to the player's average incremental 
contribution to the coalitions of which it might be a member. 
There are a variety of reasons to use a "Shapley value" 
mechanism to allocate the rewards of joint effort. It is 
well-known that such a mechanism implements the "Nash 
bargaining solution" for two-person games. 8 In other words, 
output allocated on the basis of Shapley values would maximize 
the product of gains realized by individual players relative 
to their respective default utilities. More formally, a 
Shapley value mechanism would solve the allocation problem 
max (ov(x1 ,x2 ) - v(x1)] [ (1-o)v(x1,x2) - v(x2)] 
0 
proposed by Nash (1950). 9 
Starting from a slightly different notion of justice, Young 
167 
(1988, p. 271) demonstrates that the Shapley value is the only 
sharing rule that (1) fully distributes output; (2) treats 
identical players equally; and (3) determines individual 
shares strictly on the basis of individual contributions to 
output. Hart and Moore (1990, p. 1129) observe that the 
Shapley value mechanism gives each player his or her "expected 
contribution to a coalition, where the expectation is taken 
over all coalitions to which [the player] might belong. 1110 
Any of these cooperative bargaining approaches provide the 
basis for an argument that market participants would agree in 
advance to use a Shapley value mechanism as the means of 
allocating output in the future. 11 •12 
To define the Shapley values for the bargaining game between 
a representative owner and a representative worker, I first 
observe that each of these two players is potentially a member 
of two coalitions: a coalition "of the whole" and a coalition 
consisting of the player alone. If each player bears his or 
her full cost of effort, then the net benefit to each player 
when output is allocated using Shapley's method is given by 
W1 .5(v(x1,x2 la1,a2 ) - v(x2 jaa2 )] 
+ .5[v(x1 ja1 , (1-a)a2 ) - v(O)] 
- c 1 (x1 la1 , (1-a)a2 ) (2 .1) 
.5[v(x1,x2 la1,a2 ) - v(x1 ja11 (1-a)a2)] 
+ .5[v(x2 jaa2 ) - v(O)] 
- c 1 (x2 1 aa2 ) (2.2) 
The first bracketed term in each of these equations represents 
the contribution the player makes to the coalition of whole: 
the difference between the value of output with both players 
and the value of output with only one player indicates the 
"value added" by the second player. The second bracketed term 
in each of these equations represents the contribution of (or 
value added by) each player to the empty coalition, v(O). 
Using the payoffs specified in equations (2.1) and (2.2), we 
can now define the equilibrium for the bargaining problem at 
issue. Assume that both the representative owner and the 
representative worker choose their effort levels x 1 and x2 to 
maximize their respective payoffs. If each player takes the 
choice made by the other as given, then the first order 
conditions 
.5v.(x1*,x2*la11 a 2 ) + .5v.Cx1*ja1 , (1-a)a2 ) 
- c 1 (x1*la1 , (1-a)a2 ) = o ( 2. 3) 
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.5v2(x1*,x2*la11 a 2) + .5v2(x2*laa2) 
- c 2(x2*laa2) = 0 
( 2. 4) 
jointly determine the equilibrium effort choices, x 1* and 
x2*.n Given these effort choices, the equilibrium payoffs (i.e. , net benefits) for the representat.i ve . owner* and the 
representative worker ar.e by. subst1.tut1.ng Xt and X2* 
into the objective funct1.ons g1.ven 1.n (2.1) and (2.2). 
3. The Asset Allocation Problem 
The previous section defined equilibrium a 
allocation of the assets a 1 and a 2. It now rema1.ns to see l.f 
the representative owner has the incentive to adopt a code of 
corporate conduct that would effectively some 
all) of a 2 to the (Thl.s transfer l.S formally characterized as an 1.ncrease 1.n the parameter a.) 
To determine the effect of adopting a code, it is 
necessary to indicate the specific impact of asset 
on the productivity and cost of player a 
(and thereby increasing a worker's ownershl.p cla1.m on hl.S or 
her health) would potentially have several effects .. It 
strengthen the bargaining position of workers by 1.ncreas1.ng 
the default utility v(x2laa2) for each level of effort X2. The 
asset transfer could also lower worker effort costs by 
decreasing c 2(x21ax2) andjor raise owner effort .costs by increasing ct<x11a2, (1-a)a2). In summ"':ry, I a code of conduct as a commitment to an 1.mprovement 1.n workplace 
conditions. This transfer of corporate assets from owners to 
workers gives workers a greater ownership on their own 
health. It potentially increases the product1.v1.ty and lowers 
the cost of worker effort while it raises the cost of owner 
effort. 
To evaluate the impact of such transfers on 
choices and on the net benefits realized, I exam1.ne a spec1.f1.c 
production technology and set of cost functions. Let the 
value of output produced by the set of possible coalitions be 
given by 
owner and worker together: 
( I ) [ (a X ) p + ( a2x2) p] t ip V X1 1 X2 a 1 , a 2 = I 1 
Owner alone: 
v (x1 l a 11 ( 1-a) a 2 ) 
worker alone: 
v(x2laa2) = aa2x2. 
This specification reflects the assumptions that player 2 is 
indispensable to asset a 2: player 1' s ownership share of 
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asset a 2 has no impact on output unless player 2 is also a 
member of the coalition . 14 In other words, the owner's claim 
on worker health [(1-a)a2) is meaningless unless the worker is 
involved in production. Restricting the parameter p so that 1 
> p > 0 ensures that (1) worker effort is an imperfect 
substitute for owner effort (and vice versa); and that (2) 
owners and workers produce more when working together than 
when working separately. 15 
Let the cost of effort for the representative owner and the 
representative worker be given by 
c 1(x1la11 (1-a)a2) = c 1x//(1+oa1+e(1-a)a2) 
and 
respectively. This specification reflects the assumption that 
asset ownership may influence the cost of effort for either or 
both players . The extent of the effect depends on the 
parameters o, e, and A: the larger any of these parameters, 
the larger the cost-reducing impact of asset ownership. 
4. The owner's Incentives to Adopt Code of conduct 
We can now determine when, if ever, a code of conduct can 
increase shareholder wealth. As mentioned above I 
characterize the adoption of a code as an increase in a, i'. e., 
a (partial or complete) transfer of asset a 2 from owners to 
.. Given the specified in Section 3, the 
1.ncrease 1.n a has three d1.rect effects on effort choices: as 
it (1) increases the representative worker's marginal benefit 
of effort and (2) lowers the worker's marginal cost of effort 
it also (3) raises the representative shareholder's marginai 
cost of effort. It follows that, for a wide range of 
parameter values, an increase in a implies more worker effort 
and less owner effort in equilibrium. The net impact of 
adopting a code of conduct therefore depends on the balance 
between these effort effects. 
Figures 1 and 2 illustrate the equilibrium effort choices and 
net benefits for the following parameter values: 16 
v(xltx21alla2) = [ (20xt)4/S + (20x2)4'sJs'4 
v(x1 l a 11 ( 1-a) a 2 ) 
v(x2laa2 ) = a20x2 
ct<xtla11 (1-a)a2) = 20x12/(1+20+(1-a)160) 
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b . ing problem we see that 
For this specification of. the t adopt a of conduct: 
the owner does have some l.ncen l.Ve . when 86 In other f 't · t a max1.mum · the owner's net bene l. l.S a t of a then they 
words, if owners had title the in'arket value 
could raise of tfh.e,;r) sby 14 percent of 
of their clal.m on fl.rm pro l. s 
a 2 to workers· 
What . best for owners is not The bad news is that l.S te for the more complete set of corJ?o::a necessarily best . 1 t 36 max1.m1.zes From Figure 2, l.t fol ows tha a=. stakeholders. k t benefits. In other words, 
the sum of owner :"nd wo! ert;eim rove workplace conditions, 
owners have some l.ncentthl.vte "tota! surplus" is at a maximum. 
but not to the extent a 
s. The Role of Economic Analysis 
t odes of conduct provides an 
This stylized view c;>f corpora_ e debate in the "law and 
opportunity t:o an between the initial 
economics" f1.eld: e r . hts and the efficiency of 
assignment of r;gd'cates that some ownership 
equilibrium. Fl.gure 2 l.n l.more efficient (i.e. generate 
structures for the are This observation leaves open 
a higher surplus) than o erst there is a need to mandate a 
the question of whether or no 
particular ownership structure. 
ics tells us that Pareto 
The "first th;eorem" of welf:re exchange in a 
efficiency l.S the resul t1959 1960 1988) examines a 
competitive market. Coa.se t the 'case in which there 
particular of ihl.st::esul In reviewing the importance 
is a unique effl.cl.ent al oca l.O;.itive market outcomes, cease 
of liability for zero transaction costs, the 
concludes that "1.n a reg1.me ":l. same whatever the legal 
allocation of n;sourc:es .rE7mal.n:orth:armful effects. u17 Under 
position regard.l.ng of equilibrium is invariant 
either formulatl.on, t. e e f . hts in the absence of 
to the initial assl.gnment o rl.g 
transactions costs. 
t th' . variance result breaks down 
It is generally agreed disputes abound when it 
if exchange i.s · ever . te responses to these 
comes to. defl.nl.ng structure of the model 
The vides a framework that enables us 
presented l.n thl.S essay prof th reasons for these disputes. 
to identify at least some o e 
l.. t l.' s clear that the model proposed in this essay First, d't' " for the presence of 
satisfies a "necessary . \ nment of rights does 
costs: . the t how theg initial allocation C?f 
matter. 2 l.llus trha equilibrium level of surplus l.n 
the asset a 2 1.nfluences e 
the economy. 
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The next step is to discover why the assignment of rights 
matters. Is the reason plausibly described as a "transaction 
cost"? It is clear that the allocation of rights in the model 
affects both effort costs and output shares for market 
participants. It therefore influences the equilibrium level 
of production. However, the source of the transaction costs 
is not immediately obvious since the code of conduct (i.e., 
the transfer of a 2 ) is assumed to be costlessly enforceable. 
The transaction costs in the model can be traced to the 
assumption that owner and worker effort levels are "non-
contractible" . 19 In other words, neither owners nor workers 
can write binding "forcing" contracts to ensure optimal levels 
of effort. 20 There are a variety of possible justifications 
for such an assumption: effort levels may not be directly 
observable or the courts may have found contracts contingent 
on effort to be "against public policy." In any event, the 
non-contractibility assumption forces market participants to 
resort to sharing rules such as the Shapley value mechanism. 
Given the impossibility of achieving a first-best optimum21 
with forcing contracts, we must then ask whether or not 
voluntarh exchange will at least support a second-best 
optimum. 2 In other words, will initial trade in the asset a 2 
ensure that the surplus-maximizing level of a (.36 in Figure 
2) prevails in equilibrium? Economists are conditioned to 
answer this question in the almost as an article 
of faith. In fact, the appropriateness of this response 
depends on the extent of transactions costs at the very 
earliest stage of the bargaining process. 
In their description of a model that served as an inspiration 
for the one presented in this paper, Hart and Moore (1990, p. 
1131) write 
We shall take the point of view that efficient trading at 
date 0 leads to a control structure a that maximizes 
W(x<(a)). That is, if the initial a does not maximize 
W(x<(a)), someone will propose a new a and a set of side 
payments such that everyone is better off ... 23 
In the model I propose, the equilibrium level of total surplus 
depends on the scope for trade in ap Figure 2 and the 
analysis in Section 4 indicate that owners do have some 
incentive to make unilateral transfers to workers for a wide 
range of parameter values. However, the value of a that 
maximizes shareholder wealth (.86 in Figure 2) generally fails 
to maximize total surplus. It is therefore not likely that 
owners would in general adopt the "optimal" code of ethics 
unilaterally. 
Would workers have the incentive to purchase a greater stake 
in a 2 and thereby make it possible for society as a whole to 
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realize a second best optimum? In other words, can we rely on 
workers (along with other stakeholder groups) to bargain for 
the optimal code of ethics? such a transaction would 
resurrect a "Cease-like" invariance result at this earlier 
stage in the contracting process: if there were a competitive 
market in a 2 , then there would be no efficiency justification 
for regulating the contracting process. There would be no 
reason to require minimum workplace health and safety 
standards, to adopt environmental protection laws, or to set 
minimum product safety standards. 
Economic analysis cannot provide a definitive answer to these 
policy questions; it merely enables us to examine the 
consequences of difference sets of assumptions. All policy 
applications of economic models start with a strong set of 
assumptions. The "transferrable utility" model presented in 
this paper requires that rights (however assigned) be 
costlessly enforceable and that $1 be worth the same to 
workers as to If we further assume that there is 
a competitive market in assets like worker health and 
environmental quality, then equilibrium will be (second-best) 
efficient; the initial allocation of assets will simply 
determine the final distribution of wealth. If, on the other 
hand, we assume that there are unavoidable transaction costs 
at this earlier bargaining stage, then the initial allocation 
of assets affects both the level of total surplus and its 
distribution. 
6. Concluding Observations 
Do we wish to use this type of economic analysis as a guide to 
the initial allocation of rights?25 Economic analysis itself 
cannot resolve this issue. We must ultimately return to 
extra-market notions of justice, fairness and probably just 
plain common sense. 
The discussion in Section 5 provides an outline for this 
expanded view of policy analysis. The first task is to 
identify the transaction costs at each stage in the bargaining 
process. If there are no transaction costs, we are left to 
determine the fairness of the equilibrium distribution of 
wealth given the initial allocation of rights. If the 
transaction costs (like the non-contractibility of effort) 
render (competitive) bargaining impossible at some stage, we 
are faced with a more difficult task, that of choosing the 
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Appendix: The Johnson Johnson credo 
we believe our first responsibility is 
to the doctors, nurses and patients, . 
to mothers and all others use our products 
In meeting their needs we do must be of h1gh qual1ty. 
we must constantly str1ve to reduce our costs 
in order to maintain reasonable prices. 
customers' orders must be serviced promptly and 
our suppliers and must ?ave an opportun1ty 
to make a fa1r prof1t. 
we are responsible to our employees, 
the men and women who work with us throughout the world. 
Everyone must be considered as an individual. 
we must respect their dignity and r.ecog.nize t.hei.r merit. 
They must have a sense of secur1ty 1n the1r JObs. 
compensation must be fair and adequate, 
and working conditions clean, orde.rly and safe. . 
E ployees must feel free to make suggest1ons and compla1nts. 
:'here must be equal opportunity for emploY:me.nt, development 
and advancement for those qual1f1ed. 
we must provide competent management, 
and their actions must be just and ethical. 
we are responsible to the communities in which we live and work 
and to the world community as well. 
we must be good citizens - support good works and charities 
and bear our fair share of taxes. 
we must encourage civic improvements 
and better health and education. 
we must maintain in good order 
the property we are privileged to use, 
protecting the environment and natural resources. 
our final responsibility is to our stockholders. 
Business must make a sound profit. 
we must experiment with new ideas. 
Research must be carried on, innovative programs developed 
and mistakes paid for. 
New equipment must be purchased, new facilities provided 
and new products launched. 
Reserves must be created to provide for adverse times. 
When we operate according to these principles, 
the stockholders should realize a fair return. 
Endnotes: 
1. conference Board (1992, P· 11}. 
2. White and Montgomery (1980, pp. 81-83.) See Pitt and 
Groskaufmanis (1990, p. 1602} for a discussion of this and 










3. DeGeorge (1990, p. 163) defines stakeholders to be all 
constituencies to which the firm "has any moral obligations". 
s (1984, p. 46) definition includes "any group or 
1nd1v1dual who can affect or is affected by the achievement of 
the organization's objectives." For convenience of exposition 
I adopt a somewhat narrower definition. In this paper I use 
the term "stakeholder" to indicate the set of all 
claimants except equity owners. This group 
tydp1tchally includ7s employees, suppliers, customers, clients, 
an e surround1ng community. 
4. This treatment of effort costs and asset ownership differs 
from that found in Hart and Moore (1990). I allow for 
asset ownership rather than assuming that assets are 
1nd1v1s1ble lumps that must be allocated in full to a single 
play7r. I also allow asset ownership to influence the 
marg1nal cost of effort as well as its marginal product. 
5. By "ownership" here I mean the right to use an asset 
without having to purchase it· the right to obtain full 
compensation if the asset is 'damaged; and the right to 
withhold access to the asset. 
6. This assumption reflects a more general definition of 
ownership than the one found in Hart and Moore (1990) 
Allowing fractional values for a enables me to treat 
as a diver;;e asset. ."Fractional ownership" makes it 
poss1ble to cons1der a var1ety of compensation levels for 
worker illness or injury. 
7. Note that since the functions 
v ( x 1 I . , . ) - c 1 ( x 1 I . , . ) and 
v ( x2l • ) - C2 ( x2l • ) 
indicate. the opportunities available to individual players 
when act1ng alone, these functions define the "default" or 
"reservation" utilities at given levels of effort for owners 
and workers respectively. 
8. See Shapley (1988 reprint of 1969 article, p. 316). 
9. This is a game with "transferrable" utility: monetary 
transfers have the same value to both players. The parameter 
o ser.ves to allocate joint output between the two players. 
The f1rst bracketed term represents the difference between the 
share received by player 1 and that player's default 
ut1l1ty. The second bracketed term represents the 
corresponding difference for player 2. 
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10. Rothblum (1988) provides three specifications of the 
Shapley mechanism in which "a player gets 'the average 
relative payoff to coalitions that contain him'." 
11 . For transferrable utility games with two players, 
Shapley value allocation also coinc.ides wit;h the 
bargaining solution proposed by Davl.d G.authl.er. See Gautl:aer 
(1986) and for a of. the . ethl.<;=al 
underpinnings of hl.s approach to l.ndl.Vl.dual r1ghts l.n socl.al 
contracts. The Shapley value mechanism can also be 
generalized to allow for differences in bargaining ability 
andjor broader definitions of egalitarian allocations. See 
Kalai and Samet (1985, 1988). 
12. Recent authors have also argued argue that the 
value mechanism can be interpreted in a more "strategJ.c" 
context as a noncooperative bargaining solution. Hart and 
Moore (1990, pp. 1129-30, footnote 11) observe that the 
Shapley value can be .interpreted th7 subgame perfect 
equilibrium for a multJ.stage game l.nvolvl.ng a of 
take-it-or-leave-it contracts. Gul (1989) provl.des an 
alternative interpretation for the Shapley value as a subgame 
perfect equilibrium. 
13. More formally, these first order <;ire 
and sufficient for an equilibrium if both ob)ectl.ve functJ.ons 
(W1 and W2) are differentiable and stri<;=tly (i.e;,. have 
a maximum) . Sufficient for concav1ty l.s that addl.tl.onal 
effort increases output at a decreasing rate and increases 
cost at an increasing rate: V1(x1,x2)>0, Vu(XuX2)<0, 
v2(x11 x2)>0, v22 (x11 x2)<0, vdx1)>0, Vu(Xd<O, v2(x2)>0, 
c 1' (xd>O, c 1'' (xd>O, c 2' (x2)>0, and c 2'' (x2)>0 .. The equl.ll.brl.l;lm 
defined by (2.3) and (2.4) is stable l.f V12 (XuX2) l.S 
sufficiently small. This last condition ensures a 
in effort choice by a given player has a greater l.mpact on J.ts 
own objective function than on the objective function of the 
other participants in the game. 
14. This terminology is due to Hart and Moore (1988). 
15. To see the benefit of joint effort with this 
specification, let a 1=a2=1; a=1 and p=. 5. It follows that 
v(x11 x2) = x1 + x2 + 2(x1x2) 5 > + v(x2) .= .x1 + x2" .In. other 
words, the value of output from the coall.tl.on consJ.stJ.ng of 
one worker and one owner exceeds the sum of what the worker 
and the owner can each produce separately. 
16. In particular, p=4 15, a 1=a2=c1=c2=2 o, 5=1 and €=A=8. 
17. Coase (1988), p. 170. For an earlier version of the 
Coase theorem, see Coase (1959), p. 27: "The delimitation of 
rights is an essential prelude to market ... 
ultimate result (which maximizes the value of productJ.on) l.S 
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independent of the legal decision." 
18 . . Newberry (1989, pp. 215-16) provides an overview of the 
debate over pollution externalities that has involved 
Pl.gou, Coase, Baumel, Oates and others since the 1930s. 
19. Since it is impossible to write and enforce this type of 
contract, the cost of the "transaction" is effectively 
infinite. 
20 . . A forcing contract promises payment if and only if effort 
l.n some cases output) reaches a pre-specified level. see 
Ml.ller ( 1992, Chapter 5) for a discussion of the uses and 
of this device as a method of eliminating free rl.ders. 
21. A best" optim.um is an equilibrium that is fully 
Pareto effl.cl.ent : all gal.ns from trade have been realized. 
22. A "second-best" optimum is the best feasible equilibrium 
given the constraints imposed by technology and various 
transaction costs. 
23. In the notation found in Hart and Moore (1990) is similar 
to that used in this paper: a indicates the allocation of 
assets that exist when bargaining begins, while W(X0 (a)) 
represents the sum of net benefits realized by market 
participants. 
24 . This latter assumption ensures that there are no "wealth 
effects" that distort owner andjor worker willingness-to-pay. 
2 5 · Coase has long recommended this approach. See Coase 
(1988) for his response to a number of his critics. Posner 
(1979, 1983) labels this approach "wealth maximization" and 
recommends it as a guide for judicial decision-making. 
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